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1 Introduction
Investors value financial assets not only for their intrinsic value, i.e., their expected dividend or
payment stream, but also for their liquidity: their ability to help agents facilitate transactions.
For instance, U.S Treasuries are often used as collateral in a secured credit market through
repurchase agreements, they are easily sold for cash in secondary asset markets, and, often-
times, they are used directly as means of payment. Accordingly, many liquid financial assets
are priced above their respective fundamental value, and their prices are higher than those of
illiquid assets with comparable safety and maturity characteristics. Also, the liquidity premia
account for a large part of the variation in the liquid asset prices observed in financial markets.
The objective of this paper is to examine the determinants of such liquidity premia. First,
I set up a monetary search model and use it as a guide to my empirical exercise. My model
builds upon Lagos and Wright (2005), but I extend the baseline framework in order to include
a risk-free government bond in addition to fiat money. The government bond is liquid in the
sense that it is useful in the exchange process, which is explicitly incorporated into the model.
Due to its liquidity, its equilibrium price exceeds the fundamental value, and its supply affects
the price (or the yield) through changing the liquidity premium. The ability of the bond to
facilitate trade in a goods market characterized by frictions (such as anonymity and limited
commitment) makes it a substitute for money to some degree, so that money supply, and not
only bond supply, affects the liquidity premium and, consequently, the bond’s price. The key
mechanism that links money supply and the liquidity premium is the opportunity cost of hold-
ing money. An increase in money supply raises the inflation rate and, hence, the cost of holding
money, implying a higher nominal interest rate through the Fisher effect. As a result, agents
substitute the more costly fiat money with the liquid bond, which, in turn, leads to a higher
liquidity premium and, ultimately, a higher bond price. In the extreme case in which the nom-
inal interest rate (on an illiquid bond) is close to zero, and the supply of liquid assets is scarce,
the model predicts the existence of a very high liquidity premium, and a potentially negative
nominal yield on the liquid asset. Hence, my model can help us understand the emergence of
negative yields could in several developed countries, such as Switzerland, the United States,
and Germany, since 2008.
Next, I move on to the empirical exercise that tests the primary results of the theoretical
model. In particular, I test whether money supply is positively correlated with the liquidity
premium on liquid bonds, and whether the latter is negatively correlated with bond supply.
In addition, I examine empirically whether the existence of liquidity premia can be an impor-
tant factor in explaining the aforementioned negative yields on liquid bonds. In my empirical
exercise, I use US Treasuries to capture the liquid bonds introduced in the model. To guaran-
tee robustness of the empirical analysis, I employ various measures of the liquidity premia for
these bonds: the spread of AAA-rated corporate bonds against the long term Treasury bonds,
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the TED spread, and the spreads of AA-rated Commercial Papers and Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) insured Certificates of deposits against Treasury bills.1 The choice of
these financial assets is justified by the fact that they are comparably safe but not as liquid as
Treasury bonds of similar maturities; therefore one can reasonably argue that any spread be-
tween the yield on these assets and Treasury bonds (of similar maturities) reflects differences
in liquidity premia. Next, I use a monetary aggregate, Narrow Money, as a proxy of money be-
cause it only includes components which can be used as a direct medium of exchange implied
by the theory unlike other broader monetary aggregates such as M1 and M2. Furthermore, its
demand is stable against its holding cost, or nominal interest rates in that it displays a down-
ward sloping curve over the sample period as the theory presents later.
The theoretical and empirical analysis can explain the emergence of negative nominal yields.
According to the theory, a reduction in bond supply can drive down its yield into the negative
territory, in situations where the monetary authority is setting a low (slightly above or around
zero) nominal interest rate, as has been the case recently in Switzerland and in the United States.
The empirical exercise confirms that a reduction in the bond supply increases the liquidity pre-
mium, and decreases the yield. In fact, a big drop in the supply of liquid government bonds
was markedly observed in Switzerland during the financial crisis, starting in the last quarter of
2008. It should be pointed out that the existence of negative nominal yields is often considered
anomalous, because it is hard to reconcile through the lens of traditional monetary models.
However, my model of asset liquidity can help rationalize this observation.2
From the theoretic point of view, a large money search literature presents that the liquidity
premium is a primary factor of variation in the prices of liquid financial assets, and that its sup-
ply is negatively correlated with the liquidity premium, whereas money supply is positively.
Similarly, the key mechanism in the literature is the opportunity cost of holding money. As a
pioneer theoretical paper, Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007) set up a Lagos-Wright
type of money search framework with a real asset, and theoretically present that the money
growth rate increases the liquidity premium in the economy where neither money nor assets
are plentiful. They derive this result from the model where assets are a perfect substitute to
money in transactions in a decentralized market, and money supply leads to an increase in the
opportunity cost of holding money. Similarly, several papers with this substitution relationship
between money and financial assets in the literature deliver the more or less similar results. Ex-
amples include Rocheteau and Wright (2005a), Lagos (2010b), Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright
(2012), Jacquet and Tan (2012), Williamson (2012), Carapella andWilliamson (2015), Geromicha-
1I choose the measures which Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) use in their paper for comparison
as well as an additional measure such as the TED spread. Also, the quarterly data are used here, unlike the yearly
data are used in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) to increase the sample size of the measures.
2One of the important lessons we’ve learned from asset liquidity is that it can shed light on existing asset-related
puzzles from a new perspective and provide a liquidity-based theory of asset pricing. Examples include Lagos
(2010a), Geromichalos, Herrenbrueck, and Salyer (2013), Geromichalos and Simonovska (2011), and Jung and Lee
(2015).
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los and Herrenbrueck (2016), Rocheteau, Wright, and Xiao (2016), and Geromichalos, Lee, Lee,
and Oikawa (2016). Also, Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2011) calibrate money search models
to examine how money supply affect capital formation. However, the literature has not tested
empirically its aforementioned results, and not investigated much how liquidity premia cause
the negative yields on liquid assets, either. Of course, it is worth noticing that this type of
money search model is well fitted into the study mentioned above because it can delivers sharp
predictions for the effects of money and bond supply on the liquidity premium. For example,
one time injection of money does not affect the liquidity premium, but its growth does. Hence,
money is neutral but not superneutral. Unlike money, one time injection of bonds has a sub-
stantial impact.3 A model without money, or without explicit exchange processes would not
deliver these results precisely.
To my best knowledge, while the results about the effects of money and bond supply on the
liquidity premium has not been tested empirically yet in the money search literature, there are
a few papers in the finance literature which study the supply effect on the liquidity premium
so as to present that bond supply has a negative impacts on the liquidity premium, or the
convenience yield.4 For example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) show a strong
negative relationship between the U.S. Treasury supply and its convenience yield. Greenwood,
Hanson, and Stein (2015) show that the T-bill supply has a negative impact on its liquid pre-
mium. Longstaff (2004), Vayanos (2004), Brunnermeier (2009) and Krishnamurthy (2010) inves-
tigate liquidity premia, but focus on the short time period such as financial crises. They all set
up the models without money; therefore, money supply does not affect liquidity premia at all
even if liquid bonds play a role as substitutes with money in reality, and the opportunity cost
of holding money does not work to account for it, either.
Nagel (2014) shows how this substitution relationship between money and liquid bonds af-
fect the liquidity premium through variation in the opportunity cost of holding money, which
is represented by the federal funds rate. The paper shows that federal funds rate is positively
correlated with the liquidity premium. Then, it concludes that bond supply does not have a
‘persistent’ effect on the liquidity premium unlike Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)
and Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2015). However, this result is derived from the fact that
changes in the federal funds rate are involved with changes in supply in the Treasury supply,
because the open market operation by the Federal Reserve is associated with the buying of sell-
ing of the Treasuries in the open market, even though it does not account for all the changes in
the Treasury supply. Also, it does not allow to distinguish the effect of bond supply from that
of money supply, to the effect of changes in money growth from changes in money level, or to
study specific reasons why the negative yields have been observed in the situation where the
3Rocheteau, Wright, and Xiao (2016) argue, for the first time in the literature, that this is why the open market
operations by the fed have effects on the interest rates in the market.
4The convenience yield counts for the premia from both safety and liquidity attributes of a financial assets such
as the U.S. Treasuries.
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nominal interest rate is hovering around zero. Importantly, the money search model I set up
allows me to separate these effects theoretically, and to provide a guidance to analyze why the
negative yields on liquid bonds can emerge in the aforementioned situation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a theoretic model to be tested
in Section 3. In Section 3, I provide a description of the data which are used in the empirical
work and test the results from the theory. In Section 4, I discuss negative yields on liquid bonds
with the theoretical and empirical results from the previous sections. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Physical Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. There is a discount factor between periods β ∈ (0, 1).
Each period is divided into two sub-periods. A perfectly competitive or centralized market
(henceforth CM) opens in the first sub-period, and a decentralized market (henceforce DM)
with frictions follows. The frictions are characterized by anonymity among agents and bilateral
bargaining trade. As a result, unsecured credit is not allowed in transactions, and exchange
must be quid pro quo or need secured credit. There are two divisible and nonstorable con-
sumption goods: goods produced and consumed in the CM (henceforth CMgoods) and special
goods in the DM (henceforth DMgoods). There are two types of agents; buyers and sellers,
whose measures are normalized to the unit, respectively. They live forever. Their identities are
determined by the roles which they play in the decentralized market and permanent. While
sellers produce and sell DM goods and do not consume, buyers consume and do not produce.
Their preferences in period t are given by
Buyers : U(xt, ht, qt) =u(qt) + U(Xt)− ht
Sellers : V(xt, ht, qt) =− c(qt) + U(Xt)− ht
wherext is consumption of CM goods, qt consumption of DM goods, ht hours worked to pro-
duce CM goods, and c(qt) a cost of production of qt. As usual, U and u are twice continuously
differentiable with with U ′ > 0, u′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, u′′ < 0, u(0) = 0, u′(0) = ∞, u′(∞) = 0. Also, I
assume that c(qt) = qt. Let q
∗ ≡ {q : u′(q) = 1}, i.e., it denotes the optimal consumption level in
the DM. Also, assume that there exists x∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that U ′(x∗) = 1 and U(x∗) > x∗.
There are two assets; fiat money and 1-period real government bond. They are perfectly di-
visible and storable. Agents can purchase any amount of money and government bonds at the
ongoing price φt and ψt in the CM, respectively. Money grows at the rate of µ:Mt+1 = (1+µ)Mt.
I assume that µ > β − 1, but also consider the limit case where µ → β − 1, i.e., the case where
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the money growth rate approaches closely the Friedman rule. If µ is positive, it implies that
newmoney is injected, but if µ negative, withdrawn through lump-sump transfers to buyers in
the CM. A government bond issued in period t delivers one unit of CM good in period t + 1,
and its supply in period t is At. Since we focus on stationarity equilibria, At is fixed at A.The
government (a consolidate authority) budget constraint is
Gt + Tt − φtµMt + A(1− ψt) = 0,
where Gt is government expenditure, Tt is a lump-sum transfer or tax, φtµMt is seigniorage of
new money injection, and A(1− ψt) is government debt service.
Now, I describe more details about the activities which occur in each sub-period. First, I
start with the description of the second sub-period, where a CM opens. Both buyers and sellers
consume and produce a CM good. They work or use their assets, money (m) and government
bonds (a), which they are holding from the previous period in order to consume, to pay back the
credit made in the previous period, or to adjust their portfolios. They have access to technology
that turns one unit of labor into one unit of general goods. Also, they trade money, and bonds
among all agents to re-balance their portfolio they will bring to the next period.
Next, the DM follows. All of the buyers are matched with a seller in a bilateral fashion and
vice versa. Buyers make a take-it–or-leave-it (henceforth TIOLI) offer to a seller to determine
the terms of trade.5 Since buyers are anonymous and so have limited commitment, a medium
of exchange (henceforth MOE) is required in their transactions. Both money and government
bonds can serve as media of exchange. However, the DM is divided into two sub-markets,
DM1 and DM2, depending on wht type of medium of exchange can be used. In the DM1,
sellers accept only a direct medium of exchange. Both assets are used as a direct medium of
exchange, but, unlike money, only a fraction g ∈ (0, 1) of bonds can serve as a direct medium
of exchange. g is an illiquidity parameter, and reflects the fact that a government bond is not as
liquid as money as a direct medium of exchange. Intuitively speaking, it can take time and cost
in playing a role as money do in exchange in the DM. On the other hand, in the DM2, sellers
accpet only collateralized credit (or loans), i.e., secured credit as a MOE, and bonds are used as
collateral for credit. The credit is repaid back in general goods in the forthcoming CM. Also, a
portion h ∈ (0, 1) of bonds can be used as collateral; therefore, buyers always have the incentive
to pay back their credits. This is so-called the Loan to Value (henceforth LTV) ratio, and also is
related to the haircut since it is defined by 1 minus the LTV, following the standard approach
in finance. The model will focus on cases of incentive compatible contracts. All buyers and
sellers visit DM1 and DM2 with probabilities θ and 1 − θ, respectively. Figure 1 summarizes
5I could assume that they negotiate the terms of trade through a Kalai bargaining protocol, where the buyers’
bargaining power is less than one. However, since the bargaining protocol is not critical to derive most of interest-
ing results of the paper, I use the simplest setup here by assuming that buyers make a TIOLI offer to their trading
partnert.
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the events within each period.
Figure 1: Market Timing
2.2 Value Functions
First, I describe the value function of a representative buyer who enters the CM with money
(m), bonds (a) and the collateralized credit (ℓ) made last period, since it is the buyer that makes
the key decisions for most of interesting results from themodel. The value function of the buyer
is
WB(wt, ℓt) = max
xt,ht,wt+1
{
U(xt)− ht + βE
[
V B(wt+1)
]}
(1)
s.t. xt + φ
′
twt+1 = ht + φtwt − ℓt + T
where wt = (mt, at) and φ
′
t = (φt, ψt), φt = (φt, 1). ℓt stands for the collateralized loan which
is made last period, and so must be paid back in the form of general goods. Tt is a lump-sum
transfer to the buyer. V B represents the buyer’s value function in the DM. It can be easily
verified that xt = x
∗ at the optimum. Substituting ht in the budget constraint into the value
functionWB yields
WB(wt, ℓt) = φtwt − ℓt + Λ
B
t (2)
where ΛBt ≡ U(x
∗) − x∗ + Tt + maxxt,wt+1{−φ
′
twt+1 + βE
[
V B(wt+1)
]
}. Notice that the value
function in the CM is linear in the choice variables due to the quasi-linearity of U , as in the
models which are based on Lagos and Wright (2005), so that the optimal choices of the buyer
do not depend on the current state variables.
Next, a representative seller with money, bonds, and the collateralized loan enters the CM.
6
The loan is paid back by the counterpart buyer who she met in the previous DM.
W S(wt, ℓt) = max
xt,ht
{
U(xt)− ht + βE
[
V S(0)
]}
s.t. xt = ht + φtwt + ℓt
where V S denotes the seller’s value function in the DM. Notice that wt+1 = 0 for the seller.
Since the seller does not consume any good in the DM, there is no incentive to bring money and
bonds to the next period, because the money holding cost is strictly positive due to µt > β − 1.
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It also easily verified that xt = x
∗ at the optimum as in the case of the buyer. Replacing ht into
the value function yields
W S(wt, ℓt) = φtwt + ℓt + Λ
S
t (3)
where ΛSt ≡ U(x
∗)− x∗ + βE[V S(0)].
Next, the DM opens. Buyers visits the DM1 with the probability θ and the DM2 with the
probability 1 − θ. Also, all agents match in each DM. Hence, the expected value function of a
buyer with portfolio wt+1 in the DM is given by
V B(wt) = θ
[
u(q1t ) +W
B(wt − pt, 0)
]
+ (1− θ)
[
u(q2t ) +W
B(wt, ℓt)
]
(4)
where pt = (p
m
t , p
a
t ) is a portfolio exchanged for DM goods in a meeting with a seller in DM1,
and ℓt is the collateralized loan made in DM2. q
1
t (q
2
t ) represents the quantity that are traded in
the DM1 (DM2). The terms of trades in each market are determined by bargaining in pairwise
meetings in Section 2.3.
The value function of a seller is similar except for the fact that the seller does not bring any
money and bonds to the DM for transactions.
V S(0) = θ
[
−q1t +W
S(pt, 0)
]
+ (1− θ)
[
−q2t +W
S(0, ℓt)
]
2.3 Bargaining Problems in the DM
There are two sub-markets in the DM: DM1 and DM2, depending on what type of means of
payment can be used in transactions. First, consider a meeting in the DM1 where a buyer
with portfolio wt meets with a seller. Sellers accept both money and bonds as a medium of
exchange. However, a fraction g of bonds can be accepted. The terms of trade is determined by
the proportional bargaining over the quantity of the DM goods, and a total payment of money
and bonds exchanged between them. A buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller
6See Rocheteau and Wright (2005b) for the precise and careful proof.
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to maximize her surplus under the seller’s participation constraint and the budget constraint.
Then, the bargaining problem is
max
q1
t
,p
t
{
u(q1t ) +W
B(wt − pt, 0)−W
B(wt, 0)
}
(5)
s.t.− q1t +W
S(pt, 0)−W
S(0, 0) = 0,
and the effective budget constraint pt ≤ w˜t, w˜t = (mt, g · at). Notice that since bonds are not as
liquid as money in the DM1, the effective budget is less than the total budget. Only a fraction
g ∈ (0, 1) of bonds can be used as a MOE here. Of course, I will consider the extreme case
where g → 1 later to discuss how negative interest yields emerge. Substituting (2) and (3) into
(5) simplifies the above problem as follows.
max
q1
t
,p
t
{
u(q1t )− φtpt
}
(6)
s.t.− q1t + φtpt = 0,
and pt ≤ w˜t, w˜t = (mt, g · at). The following lemma summarizes the terms of trade which are
determined by the solutions to bargaining problem.
Lemma 1. The real balances of a representative buyer are denoted as z(wt) ≡ φtwt. Define q
∗ = {q :
u′(qt) = 1}, and z
∗ as the real balances of the portfolio (mt, at) such that φtmt + gat = q
∗. Also, p∗ is
the pairs of (mt, at) in z
∗. Then, the terms of trade are given by
q1t (wt) =

q
∗, if z(w) ≥ z∗,
z(w˜t), if z(wt) < z
∗.
pt(wt) =

p
∗, if z(wt) ≥ z
∗,
wt, if z(wt) < z
∗.
(7)
Proof. See the appendix
Similarly, in the DM2, a buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a seller as in the DM1.
However, she maximize her surplus subject to a different constraint, which is the credit limit
constraint, unlike the effective budget constraint in DM1. Then, the bargaining problem is
described as follows.
max
q2
t
,ℓt
{
u(q2t ) +W
B(wt, ℓt)−W
B(wt, 0)
}
(8)
s.t.− q2t +W
S(0, ℓt)−W
S(0, 0) = 0,
and the credit limit constraint ℓt ≤ hat. Substituting (2) and (3) into (8) yields the following
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expression.
max
q2
t
,ℓt
{
u(q2t )− ℓt
}
(9)
−q2t + ℓt = 0, (10)
and ℓt ≤ hat. The solution to the bargaining problem is described by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Define the total real value of a buyer’s bond holdings as za(wt) ≡ hat. Also, define z
a∗ ≡ q∗.
The terms of trade are given by
q2t (wt) =

q
∗, if za(wt) ≥ z
a∗,
za(wt), if z
a(wt) < z
a∗,
ℓ(w) =

z
a∗, if za(wt) ≥ z
a∗,
za(wt), if z
a(wt) < z
a∗.
(11)
Proof. See the appendix
Since buyers make a TIOLI offer, i.e., they take all the bargaining power, the solution is
straightforward. The main variables to determine the level of DM goods produced are the real
balances, or the bond holdings of buyers in each transaction. For example, if the real balances
are enough to get the optimal consumption level q∗, i.e., if z(wt) ≥ z
∗, then the optimal level
will be exchanged with the corresponding payment, z∗, which can be less than z(wt). On the
other hand, if the real balances are not enough in the same sense, then the buyers will hand
over all of their real balances to the seller to purchase as many DM goods as possible. The seller
will produce the quantity that her participation constraint implies. The similar interpretation
can be applied to the DM2.
2.4 Buyers’ Optimal Choices
Now, I describe the objective function which a buyer maximize by choosing money and bonds
(mt+1, at+1) in the DM. Substituting (4) into the inside of the maximization operator in (1) and
using linearity of the value functions yield the following objective function J .
J = −φtwt+1 + β
{
θ
[
u(q1t+1) + φt+1(wt+1 − pt+1)
]
+ (1− θ)
[
u(q2t+1) + φt+1wt+1 − ℓt+1
]}
(12)
The first term stands for the cost of choosing money (mt+1) and bonds (mt+1) which buyers
bring to the forthcoming DM, and the terms in the curly bracket presents the benefits they can
obtain from transactions in the DM subject to their portfolios. Then, the Euler equations are
9
mˆφ
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Figure 2: Money Demand
aˆ
ψ
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φ
φˆβ
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φ
φˆβ
q∗
Figure 3: Asset Demand
given by
φt = β
[
(1− θ) + θu′
(
min{φt+1w˜t+1, q
∗})
)]
φt+1, (13)
ψt = β
{
θ
[
(1− g) + gu′
(
min{φt+1w˜t+1, q
∗}
) ]
+ (1− θ)
[
(1− h) + hu′ (min{hat+1, q
∗})
]}
, (14)
Figure 4 presents the continuous and decreasing money demand against the cost of holding
money captured by φt/(φt+1β), which comes from equation (13). Similarly, inserting equation
(13) into (14) shows the inverse bond demand curve against its price and it is flat in the region
where hat > q
∗. Their inverse relationship makes sense because the bond price implies the cost
of holding the bonds, given the fixed dividend in the forthcoming CM. Also, the bond demand
curve depends on the cost of holding money, and it is easily found that the curve shifts out (in)
as the money holding cost increases (decreases) as in Figure 3. This relationship is intuitively
straightforward to understand. If the money holding cost increases, agents become less willing
to hold money, i.e., the money demand will decrease. However, since the government bonds
can also play a role in relaxing the liquidity constraint in the DM to some extent as money does,
even if not 100%, the demand on the government bonds will increase.
2.5 Equilibrium and Characterization
I focus on stationarity equilibria, in which both real money and bond balances are constant over
time. It implies that φtMt = φt+1Mt+1, so that the money growth rate is equal to the inflation
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rate in the CM, i.e., 1 + µ = φt/φt+1 = 1 + π.
Definition 1. A steady state equilibrium is a list of real balances of buyers, z˜t = φtMt + gA, and
bond holdings z˜a = hA, money and bond prices φ′t, bilateral terms of trade in DM1: q(wt) and
p(wt)which are given by Lemma 1, and bilateral terms of trade inDM2: q(wt) and ℓ(wt)which
are given by Lemma 2 such that:
(i) the decision rule of a representative buyer solves the individual optimization problem (1),
taking prices φ′t and φt/φt+1 = 1 + µ as given;
(ii) the terms of trade in the DM satisfy (7) and (11);
(iii) prices are such that the CM clears, i.e., ˆwt+1 = [µMt, A] for buyers.
Then, the following lemma summarize the equilibrium objects.
Lemma 3. There exists a unique steady state equilibrium with four different cases. (i) If z˜t ≥ z
∗ and
z˜a ≥ z∗, then, q1t = q
2
t = q
∗, φt = (z
∗ − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β; (ii) If z˜t ≥ z
∗ and z˜a < z∗, then,
q1t = q
∗, q2t = z˜
a
t , φt = (z
∗ − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β
{
θ + (1− θ)
[
(1− h) + hu′ (q2t )
]}
; (iii) If z˜t < z
∗
and z˜a ≥ z∗, then, q1t = z˜t, q
2
t = q
∗, φt = (q
1
t − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β
{
θ
[
(1− g) + gu′ (q1t )
]
+ (1− θ)
}
;
(iv) If z˜t < z
∗ and z˜a < z∗, then, q1t = z˜t, q
2
t = z˜
a
t , φt = (q
1
t − gA)/Mt, and ψt = β
{
θ
[
(1 − g) +
gu′ (q1t )
]
+ (1− θ)
[
(1− h) + hu′ (q2t )
]}
.
Proof. See the appendix.
It is straightforward to understand the definition of equilibrium. Since the real money bal-
ances and the supply of bond are constant over time in the steady state, it is obvious that both
z˜t and z˜
a are also constant. Then, given the market clearing condition, z˜t and z˜
a determine the
quantities and real money and bond balances exchanged in the DM, following Lemma 1 and 2.
Now, the Euler equations, (13) and (14), for money and bond holdings with the above defi-
nition can be reexpressed as follows.
φt = β
{
1 + θ [u′ (min{z˜t+1, q
∗})− 1]
}
φt+1 (15)
ψt = β
{
1 + θ · g [u′ (min{z˜t+1, q
∗})− 1] + (1− θ)h [u′ (min{z˜a, q∗})− 1]
}
(16)
In order to examine how the equilibrium bond price respond to changes in money and bond
supply, let’s plug (15) into (16), then the price is as follows.
ψ = β
{
1 + g(
1 + µ
β
− 1) + (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1]
}
(17)
= β
{
1 + gi+ (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1]
}
(18)
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where i ≡ (1 + µ)/β − 1. The last equation is obtained by the Fisher equation, because µ = π
in the stationary equilibrium and 1/β = 1 + r when r stands for the yield on a real bond which
is not useful in the DM exchange, i.e., not liquid in the sense that it is not accepted by sellers.
Hence, i represents a nominal interest rate of a totally illiquid real bond. To distinguish nominal
yields between an illiquid bond and an liquid bond, let ρ denote the latter. Notice that Its real
price (β), which is the inverse of the real interest rate 1/β, is exactly equal to asset prices which
are defined in the traditional asset pricing models: the asset prices equal the present discount
value of their future stream of consumption dividends. Moreover, the price of a liquid bond (ψ)
is always higher than that of a illiquid bond (β) only if the asset supply is not high enough in
the sense that hA < q∗, i.e., u′(z˜a) > 1. Or, the rate of return on a liquid bond (ρ) is lower than
that on an illiquid (i). Hence, the difference between them can be used to measure the price
of the liquidity service that the liquid bond provides. Lastly, the zero net nominal interest rate
(i = 0) implies that the money growth equals the Friedman rule, i.e., µ = β − 1.
The equations, (17) and (18), present that not only bond supply, but also money supply de-
termine the equilibrium bond price together with the bond demand only if 0 < g < 1, i.e.,
only if they are substitutes to some extent in the sense that bonds help to relax the liquidity
constraint in the DM1. In other words, the demands on money and bonds are interconnected
because both of them are useful in exchange process, to a greater and lesser extent, as in the
papers in a money search literature such that Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo (2007),
in which money and real assets are perfect substitutes, and Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright
(2012), in which the illiquid parameter g is endogenized. Also, notice that (17) and (18) provide
good guidance for the empirical analysis for the liquidity premium in the next subsection, be-
cause variation in the real bond price which is affected by money or bond supply, in fact, means
changes in the liquidity premium. Notice that the fundamental value is β, which is fixed over
time. Hence, the two words can be used interchangeably when the bond price exceed the fun-
damental value.
It is worth noticing that not all µ ∈ (β − 1,∞) are consistent with a monetary equilib-
rium. In fact, a monetary equilibrium is supported for the range of (β − 1, µ¯), where µ¯ ≡
{µ : µ = β [1 + θ [u′(z˜a)− 1]]}. If we allow for the case where µ = β − 1, which implies z˜ ≥ q∗,
it will be the lower bound for a monetary equilibrium and also the marginal change in money
supply never affect the liquidity premium of bonds. Also, the upper bound µ¯ decreases in bond
supply A. It implies that agents are less patient with high inflation, so that less willing to hold
money given the supply of money, as the supply of bond increases.
The following proposition describes how the real equilibrium bond price, or the liquidity
premium, is associated with money and bond supply. As mentioned in the introduction, we
focus on the monetary equilibria, where µ ∈ (β − 1, µ¯).
Proposition 1. The real bond price exceeds the fundamental value, i.e, ψ > β, and is increasing in µ.
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Also,
(i) if z˜a ≥ q∗, ψ = ψ(µ), i.e., the bond price is only affected by the money supply.
(ii) if z˜a < q∗, ψ = ψ(µ,A), i.e., the bond price is affected by both money and bond supply. In addition,
it is decreasing in A, i.e., ψ′(A) < 0.
The proof is straightforward. Notice in Proposition 1 that µ is also replaced with i because
they are linear by the definition as in equation (18). The reason why the real bond price exceeds
its fundamental value is because they play a role to facilitate transactions in the DM; otherwise
would not occur. Hence, bonds bear a liquidity premium. If z˜a > q∗, i.e., the bond supply is
plentiful in the sense that it allows agents to purchase the optimal quantity, q∗, in the DM2.
The marginal increase in the bond supply does not allow buyers to purchase goods in the DM
anymore. In other words, changing the bond supply does not affect transactions in the DM2;
therefore does not affect the liquidity premium. However, money supply changes the liquidity
premium. For example, increasing µ raises up the opportunity cost of holding money, so that it
increases the demand on bonds and lowers the rate of return on bonds. On the other hand, If
z˜a < q∗, i.e., the bond supply is scarce, not only money supply but also bond supply affect the
liquidity premium. This is because the marginal change in the bond supply has an impact on
relaxing the liquidity constraint in the DM exchange.
Next, consider now some extreme cases where money and bonds are perfect substitutes or
not substitutes at all so as to understand intuitively how the parameters, g and 1 − θ, can af-
fect bond prices, or the liquidity premium. Moreover, I will empirically test them in Section
3 by using the U.S. data. As mentioned in subsection 2.1, g is an illiquid parameter, and im-
plies how liquid bonds are, comparing with money in DM transactions. This parameter can
be interpreted as a development stage of the secondary market or as a secondary market liq-
uidity, where bonds are exchanged for money. Less friction in the secondary market implies
higher g because less friction means that bonds are more easily converted to money, vice versa.
For example, if there are more investors or buyers for bonds due to the developed institution,
including high-quality trading platform technology, in the secondary market, assets are more
likely to be liquidated easily, and so to provide liquidity services easily. On the other hand, the
parameter 1− θ can be interpreted as how well the collateralized credit market functions. More
collateralized transactions in the financial market implies higher 1− θ.
Now, consider the four cases as follows, depending on the different combinations of g and
θ (or 1-θ). All the results come out of equations (17) and (18).
Case 1: Perfectly illiquid bonds Bonds are totally illiquid in the sense that the bonds are useless
in the DM exchange, i.e., g → 0 and θ → 1. This is the case where the bonds only function as a
store of value. Hence, the real bond price ψ is equal to the fundamental value, β, i.e., the present
value of the dividend that the bonds deliver next period, and so they do not carry the liquidity
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premium at all. Obviously, it is not affected by money and bond supply at all.
Case 2: Perfect substitutes to money Bonds are perfect substitutes to money, i.e., g → 1 and
θ → 1. The bond prices are equal to 1 + µ. Then its nominal yield ρ is give by
1 + ρ = (1 + π)
1
ψ
= φt/φt+1 × φt+1/φt = 1. (19)
The gross nominal interest rate 1 + ρ equals 1 and the net nominal interest rate equals zero all
the times. In this case, since the bonds are identical with money in terms of ability of facilitating
transactions in the DM. Moreover, they deliver dividends unlike money, their price is higher
than the fundamental value β. Also, an increase in money supply raises the bond price, or the
liquidity premium, vice versa.
Case 3: Liquid bonds but not substitutes to money Bonds are liquid in the DM, but not substi-
tutes to money at all, i.e., g → 0 and 0 < θ < 1. This is the case where the bonds are perfectly
illiquid in the DM1, and so the two decentralized markets are totally separated. Hence, the
supply of each does not affect each other, so that the liquidity premium which the bonds carry
is only affected by the bond supply.
Case 4: Liquid bonds and perfect substitutes Bonds are liquid in the DM2 and also perfect sub-
stitutes to money in the DM1, i.e., g → 1 and 0 < θ < 1. They hold extra values in exchange
process. Then, equation (17) yield the net nominal interest rate as follows.
ρ =
−β(1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
(1 + µ) + β(1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
(20)
=
(1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
i+ (1− θ)h [u′(hA))− 1)]
< 0 (21)
In this case, the numerator is always negative only if u′(hA) > 1, i.e., only if bond supply is
scarce. Also, the liquidity premium is affected by both money and asset supply. The nominal
rate of return on a liquid bond is negative, irrespective of money and bond supply, or the nom-
inal rate of return on a illiquid bond i. It implies that lenders are willing to pay interests even
though they lend money, because bonds provide extra liquidity services in transactions. The
interests are its corresponding price. I will discuss more details about under what conditions
negative interest rates emerge in a generic case in Section 4.
3 Data and Empirical Results
The theory in the previous section delivers that the real rate of return on a liquid bond is affected
by both the rate of money supply and bond supply in a general case where 0 < g, θ, h < 1,
whereas the rate of real return on a illiquid bond is unaffected. What I will primarily test here
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with the data is whether the liquidity premium is positively associated with the rate of money
supply, but negatively with bond supply, as summarized in Proposition 1. Basically, Equations
(22) and (23) are used as a guide for the empirical analysis.
3.1 Data
Before we move on to the empirical results, it is necessary to discuss how to measure all of
the variables mentioned above such as the liquidity premium, money supply (or, the nominal
interest rate of an illiquid bond), and bond supply from the data. As well known, the real
rates of return are not observed in reality. Moreover, there exist various types of monetary
aggregates such as Monetary Base, Narrow Money, M1, and M2, which we can use to measure
money supply.
First, I describe how to measure the liquidity premium. Except for some extreme cases,
from the theoretical point of view, a change in the rate of return on a real bond is equal to a
change in the liquidity premium, only if the bond is default free, i.e., safe. However, it is not
observable. Only the nominal yield are observable. Here, as in the literature, I use the yield
spread between a liquid bond and an illiquid bond as a proxy the liquidity premium. This way
is not only feasible, but also consistent with the theory. The theory presents the nominal yields
of an illiquid real bond, a liquid real bond, and the spread between them as follows.
1 + i = (1 + π)(1 + r) = (1 + π)
1
β
1 + ρ = (1 + π)
1
ψ
s = i− ρt ≈ ψ − β =
[
1 + g(
1 + µ
β
− 1)
]
+ (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1] (22)
= 1 + gi+ (1− θ)h [u′ (z˜a)− 1] (23)
As we used in deriving Equation (17), the first two equations present the nominal yields of an
totally illiquid bond and a liquid bond by the Fisher equation. Then, subtracting the former and
the latter delivers the approximate yield spread between them, which is given by Equations (22)
and (23). This subtraction eliminate the effect of the inflation rate on the nominal yields of both
bonds at the same time and, therefore, leave the liquidity premium alone from other compo-
nents in bond prices. As a result, this spread exactly measure the liquidity premium which is
presented in the theory, and also can be observable in the data only if we find two different
bonds in terms of liquidity. They should have same, at least or similar maturities and default
risks.
As seen in Equations (22) and (23), the spread can be affected by the opportunity cost of
holding money, and the money holding cost can be represented by either money or a nominal
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interest rate in the regression. However, the question to be asked here is which variable is more
appropriate, because they stands for the same economic notion. The empirical result can show
the answer to it. In other words, we can test which variable is more suitable to explain changes
in the liquidity premium in the next section.
Next, what should liquid and illiquid bonds be in reality? First, when it comes to a liquid
bond, we define a liquid bond in the model as a bond which is useful in exchange process. In
reality, it implies that the liquid bond should be easy to sell for cash in the secondary market, to
accept directly as a medium of exchange, or to be used for credit (or loans) in the credit market
such as the Repurchase Agreement market (or REPO in short) and the federal funds market.
Moreover, it should be safe in the sense that it is sure to deliver its dividend at maturity, i.e.,
there is no probability to default until maturity. For this reason, here, I use the yields of all types
of Treasuries such as Treasury bonds, notes and bills, as the nominal yields of the liquid bond
in the model.
On the other hand, an illiquid bond in the model implies a bond which can not be used
in exchange, and its holder should hold it until maturity for cash because he does not like to
accept a huge discount for the secondary trade. It is inferior to the liquid bond only in terms
of liquidity. Hence, they should be exactly or similarly as safe as the liquid bond to avoid the
case where the yield difference reflects the risk premium. Of course, in the case where there
is a little difference in terms of the default risk, it can be controlled in regressions by adding
variables to explain it. Moreover, the maturities should be the same for both bonds. In real-
ity, however, since there exists the secondary market for almost all of bonds only if sellers of
bonds accept more or less, or even considerable losses, there would not exist a perfectly illiq-
uid. In other words, it is hard to find totally illiquid bonds, even if they are almost as safe as
Treasuries and have the same or similar maturities. Taking this into account, I use the yields
of Aaa-rated corporate bonds, 3-month Commercial Papers, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC) insured Certificates of deposits (henceforth FDIC CDs) as in Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)7. I will match each of those yields with Treasuries, with consideration
for maturity to compute the liquidity premium on each maturity.
Lastly, I also use TED spreads, which is used frequently as a measure for the liquidity pre-
mium in the literature. The TED spread is the spread between 3-month LIBOR based on US
dollars and 3-month Treasury Bill. Even though 3-month LIBOR based on US dollars bears the
risk premium because the contracts between banks are not default free, it can be controlled and
absorbed by a variable to represent default risk in the regression.
Next, consider which of monetary aggregates should be used to measure money supply in
the data. As mentioned above, there are a number of monetary aggregates which are released
by the Fed: Monetary Base, Narrow Money, M1, M2, and M3. There are two criteria to think
7I updated the yields of Aaa-rated corporate bonds and 3-month Commercial Papers in their dataset by using
the data FRED Economic Data (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/) provides because some values are revised.
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about which one is appropriate. First, what the theory regards as money is perfectly liquid
in a exchange process, or it is a perfect medium of exchange, comparing to bonds. Hence,
money should not include any type of illiquid financial assets such as savings deposits in-
cluding money market deposit accounts and small-denomination time deposits, which is time
deposits in amounts of less than $100,000.8 Then, this criterion excludes M2 or more broader
Monetary Aggregates such asM3. Secondly, its demand against the opportunity cost of holding
it, i.e., the nominal interest rate (or the inflation rate) should be stable. If it is not, the mecha-
nism through which the theory functions does not work. When the opportunity cost of holding
money rises up, the demand should be declined. Only if this mechanism works, it leads to an
increase in the demand on liquid bonds as a substitute, so that the liquidity premium the bonds
bear rises up in the end. However, the demand on M1 against the nominal interest rate is not
stable, so that M1 is excluded as a explanatory variable in the regression.9
Based on the aforementioned criteria, I use Narrow Money as a measure of money. Narrow
Money is well suited to the theory in the sense that it is easily used as a medium of exchange
in transactions.10 Also, it presents a stable demand curve over the sample period, i.e., a un-
ambiguously negative relationship with the nominal interest rate over the period from 1946 to
2008. Notice that I use the Federal Funds rate as a proxy of the nominal interest rate on illiquid
financial bonds. I could use other interest rates such as 3 month commercial paper rate, but
they deliver the same relationship because they have strong co-movement historically. Figure 4
displays the ratio of Narrow Money to nominal GDP against its holding cost (i), which implies
L = M/PY in order to look at the real demand on money or real money balances proportional
to Y implied by Equation 15.In the case where bond supply is not plentiful, it can be reexpressed
to present the money demand as follows.
φt
φt+1β
= 1 + θ [u′(z˜)− 1]
⇔ 1 + i = 1 + θ [u′(z˜)− 1] ,
where φt
φt+1β
= 1 + i.11
Also, notice that money growth rate has a one to one relationship with the nominal yield of
a totally illiquid bond in the stationary equilibrium, which is implied by the Fisher equation,
i.e., 1 + i = (1 + π)(1 + r) = (1 + µ)/β. The nominal interest rate as an index of the opportu-
nity cost of money holding has a positive impact on the liquidity premium through the similar
8Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/current/default.htm
9See Lucas Jr. and Nicolini (2015) for details about the stability of M1. The paper investigate why monetary
aggregates become unstable over time.
10NarrowMoney includes nonbank public currency used as a medium of exchange, deposits held at Federal Re-
serves Banks, and reserve adjustment magnitude, which is“adjustments made to the monetary base due to changes
in the statutory reserve requirements”. See http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/03/09/0309ra.xls
for details.
11Since z˜t = z˜t+1 in stationary equilibria, the time subscript is omitted.
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Figure 5: Bond Demand
mechanism in which money growth works. The problem can be that there are a variety of inter-
est rates in the financial market, and it is also difficult to find the yields of totally illiquid bonds.
However, as well-known, they have strong co-movement relationship among them. Here, I use
the Federal Funds rate as a proxy of the nominal interest rate which the model presents. The
Federal Funds rate can reflect the money holding cost better than any other, because it is highly
correlated with other short term interest rates which agents in an economy can consider as sub-
stitutes for cash. even if it is not perfectly substitutes. Moreover, since it is the policy interest
rate which the Fed has been using, it is comparable to money supply.
Last but not least, I use the ratio of the outstanding stock of the public debt to the nominal
GDP as a proxy of liquid bond supply as in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). The
ratio of Debt to GDP is measured as the market value of the public debt at the end of a fiscal
year divided by the GDP of the same year.12 Using the same data allows for comparison of
my empirical results with the results which Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and
Nagel (2014) deliver.
Figure 5 looks at the bond demand against the yield spread between the Aaa-rated corporate
bond and the long term Treasury bond. Notice that, as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2012) points out, it is the bond demand for not only liquidity but also safety, but it is mainly
driven by the demand for the liquidity services Treasuries provide. It had been stable up until
2008 in the sense that it is an unambiguous downward sloping curve, but after 2009, the de-
mand seems to shift out after the recent financial crisis. This is similar to the money demand.
For this reason, I only use the data over the period from 1945 up to 2008.
12See Henning Bohn’s website for more details: http://econ.ucsb.edu/ bohn/data.html
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3.2 Empirical Results
Now, I describe the details about the empirical test of the theoretic results. The liquidity pre-
mium can be measured by the nominal yield spread between two bonds, which are different
only in terms of liquidity, but similar in terms of maturities and default risks. Since the bonds
or the financial assets which are regarded as illiquid bonds in section 3.1 bear low default risk,
or similarly as safe as Treasuries, we can compute several different yield spreads between them
and Treasuries, depending on maturities. Here, I use the yield spread between Aaa-rated cor-
porate bonds and the long term Treasuries, which are long-term bonds. Also the yield spreads
between Aa-rated commercial papers and 3-month Treasury bills, and between 6-month FDIC
insured Certificates of Deposit (henceforth CD) and 6-month Treasury bills, which are short-
term bonds because their maturities are shorter than one year.13
It is worth noticing that all of those spreads reflect the market values for the liquidity ser-
vices the Treasuries provide, but different in the sense that the former is the liquidity premium
on the long term Treasuries and the latter on the short term Treasuries. Hence, the factors which
affect each of the spreads can differ, even though they have theoretically equivalent meanings.
For example, the opportunity costs of holding money in the theory can be represented by either
money growth or a nominal interest rate. If money growth increases,then the nominal interest
rate will also increase by the Fisher effect, i.e., through an increase in the inflation. Hence, this
money holding cost can bemeasured by either money growth or nominal interest rates, because
they have the same economic sense. Here, I will verify which of these factors is more suitable
to explain changes in the liquidity premia, which are measure by several measures, through the
empirical test. In fact, Nagel (2014) presents that the Federal Funds rate has a positive effect on
the liquidity premia, which are measured monthly only by some short term bonds. However,
here I show the liquidity premia are also affected by money growth or supply. and also how it
is robust to the liquidity premium of the long term bond such as the long term Treasuries.
Notice that I use the log difference form only for money supply in the regressions. As seen
in Equation (15), it is the rate of money supply (or the money growth rate) that affects the liq-
uidity premia, not the absolute level of money supply. One time change in money supply does
not affect real variables in the model, but its growth rate does. (Money is not super-neutral but
neutral.) Under flexible prices, a one time increase in money supply is ineffective because its
relative price is adjusted to keep the real value unchanged. On the other hand, I use the level
of the debt to the nominal GDP ratio in the regression, because it is not neutral unlike money.
Even one time change in bond supply affect the real variables such as real balances, quantities
traded in the DM.
When it comes to default risks or premium which can be included in the yield spreads,
13I use the spreads which are used in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) but slightly different because
they are updated from the original source.
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although the Aaa-rated corporate bond and commercial paper are not exactly as safe as the
Treasuries, those spreads are primarily driven by liquidity given the low default rate on Aaa
bonds and Aa commercial papers.14 In order to control default risk in the regressions, the stock
market volatility will be used as a default control variable, which is used in Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).15 Including this measure in the regressions makes sure that changes
in the yield spreads can be driven mainly by changes in the liquidity premia. Lastly, FDIC in-
sured CDs are as safe as Treasuries, given FDIC insurance, so that its spread against the same
maturities of Treasuries can be used as a good proxy of the liquidity premium.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate how money growth rate had evolved with the different measures
of the liquidity premium over the sample period. The figures shows that the movement of
money growth is closely related to the liquidity premium, and their variations are also similar
in terms of frequency and width.
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Table 1 presents the impacts of money growth, bond supply, and the Federal Funds rate
on the liquidity premium, which is measured by the yield spread between Aaa-rated corpo-
rate bond and the long term Treasury bond. Regressions (1) to (3) look at the impact of money
supply with bond supply on the liquidity premium which the long-term Treasuries carry. In
particular, Regression (2) and (3) test whether Treasury bonds are substitutes with money or
not. The theory predicts that if they are not substitutes, money growth does not affect the liq-
uidity premium of Treasuries at all, because the money market are totally separate from the
bond market. However, the regression results display that money growth has a significant and
14See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) for details. According to them, “there have never been a
default on high-grade CP.” Also, they use the spread of Aaa-rated bonds against Treasuries to estimate the market
value of the liquidity convenience, assuming that the default risk of the Aaa-rated bonds is low.
15See Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) for the details about why this measure can be a proxy for
default risk. In short, they argues that this measure have a high correlation with another default risk measure such
as the median expected default frequency credit measure fromMoody’s Analytics.
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positive impact on the liquidity premium. Also, bond supply is negatively correlated with
the liquidity premium. An increase in bond supply reduces its market price for the liquidity
services which the bonds provide. It implies that Treasury bonds are substantive substitutes
with money to some degree. The negative effect of bond supply is consistent with Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) even without the log specification16, and also is robust to
default risk. Since a control variable for default risk is included as an explanatory variable in
Regression (3), changes in the spread can be regarded as being primarily driven by the liquidity
premium even if it is not perfect. On the other hand, Regression (4) to (6) show the impact of the
Federal Funds rate on the liquidity premium. Unlike money supply, its impact on the liquidity
premium is not significant in the regressions with bond supply.
Table 1: Impact of money growth on Aaa Cor. - Treasury Bond Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1946-2008 1946-2008 1946-2008 1955-2008 1955-2008 1955-2008
NM Growth 1.648** 0.917*** 0.557***
(0.735) (0.244) (0.160)
Debt to GDP -1.496*** -1.326*** -3.795*** -3.188***
(0.421) (0.295) (0.710) (0.745)
Volatility 4.495*** 3.484***
(0.893) (0.903)
Federal funds rate 0.0564*** 0.000219 -0.00253
(0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0152)
Constant 0.654*** 1.348*** 0.690*** 0.509*** 2.258*** 1.567***
(0.0833) (0.205) (0.211) (0.120) (0.366) (0.434)
Observations 63 63 63 54 54 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.092 0.417 0.610 0.166 0.542 0.661
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by Newey-West estimators with lag(1) and its standard errors are
presented in parenthesis. The dependent variables are the yield spreads between private and Trea-
sury bonds, which are measured in a percentage unit. Explanatory variables are the growth rate of
NarrowMoney and the ratio of the market value of Treasury debt outstanding to nominal GDP. A
control variable for the default risk on private assets is V olatility, which is measured by annual-
ized standard deviation of weekly log stock returns on the S&P 500 index (Source: Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Next, Table 2 use different measures of the liquidity premium: the yield spread of AA-rated
Commercial Papers, and FDIC CDs against Treasury Bills, and the TED spread. All the regres-
sions present that the impact of money growth is significantly positive and is robust with bond
supply and default risk controls. This results strongly support the idea that Treasury Bills are
substitutes with money like Treasury bonds. Notice that Regressions (5) to (7) do not include a
control variable for default risk because the FDIC CDs as a totally illiquid financial asset are as
safe as Treasuries, and so its spread with Treasuries only reflects the difference between liquid-
16They use the log specification in their regressions because it provides a good fit and there is only one parameter
they are interested in.
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ity services which they provides. 17
Regressions (4), (7), and (11) present how the Federal Funds rate affects the liquidity pre-
mium in the case where bonds are substitutes with money as in Regressions (3), (6) and (10).
The Federal Funds rate as a proxy of the nominal interest rate is equivalent theoretically to
the money growth, because both of them stand for the opportunity cost of holding money.
In Regression (4) and (11), the Federal Funds rate has a positive impact on the liquidity pre-
mium, which is measured by the yield spread between AA CPs and Treasury Bills, and the
TED spread, whereas it does not in Regression (7). Also, bond supply still has a significant and
strong negative effect on the liquidity premium. This is different from the results which Nagel
(2014) delivers. The paper argues that there is no impact of the bond supply on the liquidity
premium. However, the paper does not look at the measures of the liquidity premium which
are used here: the AAA cor. - Treasury bond spread, and the 6-month FDIC CDs - Treasury Bill
spread. even though they also reflect the liquidity premium.
Lastly, it seems that money growth has a significant and positive impact on the liquidity
premium , and also the nominal interest rate has a positive effect on it in some cases. Even if
money growth and the nominal interest rate are equivalent because both money growth and
the nominal interest rate mean the opportunity cost of holding money, but not in the data. This
result may come from the fact that short and long term bonds are traded for different reasons
or in different institutions, even though they are similar in terms of liquidity, so that short and
long term spreads may have different liquidity attributes in reality. However, this result does
not change the economic mechanism of how money and liquid bond interact in the financial
market. It still provides strong support for the results above: bond prices bear the liquidity
premium, bonds are substantive substitutes with money even if not perfect, and the money
holding cost is a key factor in the mechanism which deliver the aforementioned results.
17The regressions with the quarterly data over the same period present the similar result. See Appendix B for
details.
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Table 2: Impact of money growth on the spreads (Yearly)
Variables AA CP - T-Bills FDIC CDs - T-Bills TED spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1946-2008 1946-2008 1946-2008 1955-2008 1984-2008 1984-2008 1984-2008 1986-2008 1986-2008 1986-2008 1986-2008
NM Growth 1.681*** 1.256*** 1.168*** 2.378*** 2.535*** 1.341*** 1.343*** 1.209***
(0.543) (0.247) (0.298) (0.249) (0.231) (0.194) (0.187) (0.224)
Debt to GDP -0.871* -0.829* -0.564 -5.471*** -5.074*** -0.0543 0.980 0.212
(0.471) (0.430) (1.037) (1.584) (1.777) (1.535) (1.665) (1.127)
Volatility 1.097 0.271 2.010 1.608
(1.722) (1.344) (1.464) (1.521)
Federal Funds Rate 0.0947*** 0.0366 0.0923*
(0.0323) (0.0463) (0.0468)
Constant 0.586*** 0.990*** 0.829*** 0.362 -0.0569 2.151*** 2.026** 0.565*** 0.588 -0.120 -0.0824
(0.0784) (0.272) (0.254) (0.435) (0.134) (0.633) (0.785) (0.107) (0.668) (0.808) (0.447)
Observations 63 63 63 54 25 25 25 23 23 23 23
Adjusted R-squared 0.037 0.076 0.066 0.210 0.272 0.551 0.206 0.180 0.139 0.147 0.233
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by Newey-West estimators with lag(1) and its standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The dependent variables are the yield
spreads between private and Treasury bonds, which are measured in a percentage unit. Explanatory variables are the growth rate of Narrow Money and the ratio of
the market value of Treasury debt outstanding to nominal GDP. A control variable for the default risk on private assets is V olatility, which is measured by annualized
standard deviation of weekly log stock returns on the S&P 500 index (Source: Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4 Discussion on Negative Interest Rates
Negative interest rates have been observed in some countries such as the United States, Switzer-
land, Japan and Germany, in particular, for the recent years after 2008. For example, in Switzer-
land, the yields of almost all the government bonds have been negative after 2008. In addition,
the yield of 3 month Treasury Bills in the United States had been negative during several days
in September, 2015, even if the federal fund rates were slightly positive.
The negative yields, or interest rates imply that lenders pay borrowers interests on their bor-
rowings. It wouldn’t make sense if interest rates were considered as the risk premium which
is compensated for borrowers’ default risk, because it is the lenders that take the default risk
of the loans. Since cash is unambiguously as safe as any other government bonds, the lenders
could hoard physical cash in their safes, whose interest rate is 0%, i.e., can never be negative.
Then, why have we observed the negative interest rates in reality? Or, why do not investors in
the financial market choose to hold cash, instead of the government bonds?
First, consider a financial market where investors are always willing to pay for the liquidity
service the governments bonds provide. For example, in some financial markets such as Re-
purchase Agreement markets and the collateralized federal funds market, liquid bonds such
as the government bonds are necessary as collateral in transactions. Theoretically, this can be
regarded as the case where the value of 1 − θ in the model is not small. As shown before, the
yield of a liquid bond from the model is given by
ρ =
(1− g)
[
1+µ
β
− 1
]
− (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
(1− g) + g 1+µ
β
+ (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
(24)
=
(1− g)i− (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
1 + gi+ (1− θ)h [u′(za)− 1]
. (25)
The theory predicts that there is a high chance that the negative yield would emerge, in partic-
ular, when bond supply decreases, and the nominal interest rate is low: money is not in short.
This is because the liquidity services which liquid bonds provide are valued high relatively
when the money holding cost is low. It implies that the bond buyers would be willing to accept
the negative yields of the bonds to hold them in their portfolios for transactions. In fact, it is
supported by the comments from the market participants during the periods of the low nomi-
nal interest rate. For example, according to Bloomberg (September 25, 2015), Kenneth Silliman,
head of U.S. short-term rates trading in New York at TD Securities unit, one of 22 primary deal-
ers that trade with the Fed said,
“Yields on U.S. Treasury bills fell below zero as an influx of cash and pent-up appetite for safe as-
sets led investors to accept negative returns after the Federal Reserve decided not to raise its short-term
interest rate. ...... Investors will have additional funds totaling about $100 billion returned to them in
24
the next month as the government cuts bill supply heading into negotiations with Congress about the
statutory debt limit”, 1819
To summarize in brief, this article says that the main factors which drove down the negative
interest rate below zero were ‘an influx of cash and a cut in bill supply.’ Also, remember that
the policy rate of the Fed, has been hovering around zero for more than 7 years since 2008. In
other words, when the negative interest rate occurred, the money holding cost was low, and
also the bill supply was expected to decrease. However, there have existed strong demand on
the government bonds. Both factors were at work together in the direction to raise up the liq-
uidity premium of liquid bonds such as Treasury bills, so that the interest rate seemed to fall
down to the negative territory.
Interestingly, this negative yield can also be explained by ‘an influx of cash’ in addition to
‘a cut in bill supply’. As shown theoretically and empirically in the previous sections, money
supply (or growth) increases the liquidity premium, whereas bond supply decreases it. Hence,
with a slight abuse of the theory, this fall of the yield to the negative territory can be interpreted
as an increase in the liquidity premium which the government bonds bear.
Moreover, we can find another example which the theory can be applied to in Switzerland.
As shown in Figure 8, the negative yields on government bonds have been observed for a sub-
stantial period of time since 2008. Also, it looks at how money and the government bond sup-
ply have been evolving. The ratio of the government bond supply relative to GDP shrank from
around 50% to around 30%, whereas the money supply, measured by M120, relatively increased
more than twice during the same period. If we apply the empirical result to this example, it
is highly likely that the relative scarcity of the liquid government bonds against money in the
market have led to an increase in the high liquidity premia on the government bonds. More-
over, the interest target range of the Swiss National Bank was 0-1.00% at then end of 200821,
and, after then, continued to decrease, and fell into the negative target. Accordingly, it can be
inferred that the main factor for the negative interest rates is the high liquidity premia on the
liquid government bonds due to their short supply.22
18Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-17/treasury-bill-yields-turn-negative-as-fed-
leaves-rates-unchanged
19See the following comment in The Wall Street Journal (Sept 23, 2014) for another example: “Short-term debt
trading at negative yields was essentially unheard of before the 2008 financial crisis. But since then, the condition
has cropped up at times of market stress, reflecting extraordinarily expansive central-bank policy and anemic
growth in much of the world. Yields on some U.S. bills traded below zero at the end of each of the past three years
amid strong demand for liquid assets, according to analysts.” Source: http://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-
bill-yield-tips-into-negative-territory-1411516748
20It includes currency in circulation, sight deposits and deposits in transaction accounts.
21It is fixed at 0 - 1.00% on 12/11/2008, 0 - 0.75% on 3/12/2009, 0 - 0.25% on 8/3/2011, -0.75 - 0.25% on
12/18/2014, and -1.25 - -0.25% on 1/15/2015.
22Also, according to Aleks Berentsen, Swiss government bonds can be used as collateral in somemarkets outside
of Switzerland but where the Swiss franc cannot. It implies Swiss government bonds have higher (1 − θ), so that
there are higher possibility that their yields would be negative in the case where liquid bonds are scarce.
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Figure 8: Interest Rates, Money and Gov’t Bond Supply in Switzerland
5 Conclusion
This paper explores the effects of money and bond supply on the liquidity premia in the prices
of liquid financial assets such as government bonds. The theory delivers elaborate predictions
about under which conditions money supply can affect the liquidity premia. For example, it has
a positive impact on them by changing the opportunity cost of holding money and so affecting
the demand on liquid bonds only when liquid bonds are substitutes with money, even if partial.
Moreover, in the case where they are perfectly substitutes, the negative yields on liquid bonds
can appear in the equilibrium. On the other hand, the bond supply also directly affects the
liquidity premia by changing relative scarcity of bonds in the market. Lastly, the empirical
analysis presents a strong support for the theoretical findings. The US data display that money
supply or the nominal interest rate as a proxy of the money holding cost has a positive impact
on the liquidity premium, whereas bond supply has a negative impact. Also, it describes how
the liquidity premia are associated with negative nominal yield on liquid bonds which were
observed in the US and Switzerland.
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A Appendix
Proof. Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2.
First, consider Lemma 1. Substituting φtpt into the objective function in Equation 6 re-
express the bargaining problem as
max
q
{u(q)− q}
subject to q = φp, and p ≤ w˜t. If φw˜t ≥ q
∗, the optimal choice of q will be the first best quantity
q∗, i.e., q = q∗. Then, p = (pm, pa) such that φpm + gpa = q∗. However, if φw˜t < q
∗, the effective
budget constraint is binding. Accordingly, the buyer will give up all her real balances in order
to purchase as many as possible. Then, the optimal choice of q will be the same as her real
balances φw˜t. Also, p = (m, a). When it comes to Lemma 2, the same steps above can be taken
for proof. Since it is straightforward, it is omitted.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 3
First, consider whether the real balances are as a direct medium of exchange or as collateral
to borrow credit enough to obtain the optimal quantity q∗ in each of the two DM markets.
If z˜ ≥ q∗ or z˜a ≥ q∗, q1 = q∗ or q2 = q∗; otherwise, q1 = z˜ or q2 = z˜a by lemmas 1 or 2.
Then, plugging these result into the first order conditions (??) and (??) for the maximum of
the objective function will yield the equilibrium prices φ and ψ. Also, the marginal utility
function u′ is monotonically decreasing in its argument, so that the equilibrium is uniquely
determined.
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B Impact of money growth on the liquidity premium: Quarterly Data
Table 3: Impact of money growth on the liquidity premium (Quarterly, 1946Q1-2008Q4)
Variables AAA Cor. - Treasury Bond AA CP - T-Bills TED Spread
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES 1946Q1-20008Q4 cpbill1 cpbill1 tedspread tedspread tedspread
NM Growth 3.060*** 2.353*** 1.144*** 1.740*** 3.116*** 3.863***
(0.999) (0.222) (0.170) (0.230) (0.211) (0.353)
Dept to GDP -1.708*** -1.969*** -1.742*** -0.0345 -2.940*** -0.0337
(0.250) (0.367) (0.418) (0.308) (0.922) (1.321)
Federal Funds Rate -0.0235* 0.0926*** 0.0914***
(0.0136) (0.0122) (0.0193)
Constant 0.709*** 1.716*** 2.038*** 0.587*** 1.424*** 0.0312 0.616*** 2.314*** 0.264
(0.0406) (0.135) (0.254) (0.0538) (0.236) (0.185) (0.0565) (0.539) (0.731)
Observations 252 172 172 151 151 151 92 92 92
Adjusted R-squared 0.064 0.320 0.276 0.005 0.209 0.422 0.184 0.329 0.201
Notes: Coefficients are estimated by Newey-West estimators with lag(1) and its standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The dependent
variables are the yield spreads between private financial assets and Treasuries. They are measured in a percentage unit. Explanatory variables
are the growth rate of Narrow Money and the ratio of the market value of Treasury debt outstanding to nominal GDP. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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